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ABSTRACT
Deep learning has become the de-facto computational paradigm
for various kinds of perception problems, including many privacy-
sensitive applications such as online medical image analysis. No
doubt to say, the data privacy of these deep learning systems is
a serious concern. Different from previous research focusing on
exploiting privacy leakage from deep learning models, in this paper,
we present the first attack on the implementation of deep learning
models. To be specific, we perform the attack on an FPGA-based
convolutional neural network accelerator andwemanage to recover
the input image from the collected power traces without knowing
the detailed parameters in the neural network. For the MNIST
dataset, our power side-channel attack is able to achieve up to 89%
recognition accuracy.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; • Hardware→ Hardware accelerators;
KEYWORDS
Power side-channel attack, convolutional neural accelerators, pri-
vacy leakage
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural network (DNN) is widely used in many safety-critical
and security-sensitive artificial intelligence (AI) applications such
as biometric authentication, autonomous driving, and financial
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fraud analysis. Consequently, their security is a serious concern
and requires urgent research attention.
Recent research has shown the security and privacy of DNN
models can be compromised. In [27], attackers deceive the DNN
system to make misclassifications by adding small perturbation to
the original images. In [7], malicious parties are able to recover
private images that are used to train a face recognition system by
analyzing the outputs of the DNN model. However, the success
of these attacks requires the full knowledge of the DNN model,
which is not usually available in real-world applications as model
parameters are valuable assets for deep learning tasks and are
always kept confidential. In addition, a variety of privacy-leaking
prevention techniques [1, 24, 28] has emerged to mitigate these
attacks.
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Figure 1: Deep learning flow: at training stage, a training al-
gorithm generates a prediction model from a large number
of training examples, while at inference stage, a inference
engine predict the result from real-world inputs with the
trainedmodel. (1) existing research assumes attacks onDNN
models (2) our approach attacks the hardware of inference
engine.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, apart from the privacy leakage from DNN
models, the information of real-world inputs can also be leaked
at inference stage which remains largely unexplored before. In
privacy-sensitive systems, the direct access to the input data of
the inference engine is often strictly controlled so that it is nearly
impossible for potential adversaries to retrieve private informa-
tion in a stealthy manner. For instance, encrypted medical images
are provided to the DNN inference engine and they are decrypted
inside the inference engine to prevent eavesdropping on the com-
munication paths. Under such circumstances, we are concerned
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whether attackers can use side channel information (e.g., power
consumption) to retrieve private data.
Dedicated DNN accelerators are expected to gain mainstream
adoption in the foreseeable future due to their high computation
efficiency [35]. In this paper, we present a power side-channel attack
on an FPGA-based convolutional neural network (CNN) accelerator
which performs the task of image classification. The attack target
on the hardware component executing the convolution operation in
the first layer of CNN which is usually implemented by line buffer,
a common structure in many image-related processing hardware.
The primary objective of our attack is to recover the private input
image from eavesdropping the power consumption of the neural
accelerator when it performs calculations for the first layer.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed attack is the first
one that exploits the privacy leakage in neural accelerators using
power side channels. Particularly, unlike previous privacy attacks
targeting at reproducing samples in the training set using model
outputs [7], our proposed attack aims to recover the input being
inferenced and we do not assume the pre-requisite knowledge of
model parameters or model outputs. The main contributions of our
work include:
• Power side channel is often quite noisy, and the collected
power trace contains distortions brought by various circuit
components. We present a novel power extraction technique
to precisely recover the power consumption for each clock
cycle.
• We develop novel algorithms to retrieve each pixel value of
the input image. To be specific, as the convolution operation
only relates to a limited number of pixels, we develop algo-
rithms to infer the values of pixels either from power traces
directly or from a pre-built power-pixel template. Finally,
the image can be reconstructed by piecing all inferred pixels
together.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the background knowledge with threat model follows
in Section 3. Next, we give an overview on the proposed attack
flow in Section 4 for two attack scenarios. We introduce how to
accurately estimate the power from the noisy power side channels in
Section 5. The details of the two attack scenarios are then introduced
in Section 6 and in Section 7, respectively. Finally, we discuss related
work in Section 8 and conclude this work in Section 9. In addition,
to illustrate the preliminaries of our proposed attack more clearly,
we give a detailed introduction of the concept of convolutional
neural network and the design of neural accelerators. Also, we
discuss the power measurement setup and characterization of the
neural accelerators in Section A in the Appendix. Then we talk
about the limitation and countermeasures in Appendix B and give
the results of our attack on the MNIST dataset in Appendix C.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief introduction to convolutional neural
network, neural accelerators and the power characterization of the
accelerator, respectively. For more information, readers can refer
to Section A in the Appendix.
Convolutional Neural Network: Convolutional neural network
has been the prevalent network architecture in image-related pro-
cessing tasks. It is constructed by a sequence of layers where the
first few layers perform the convolutional operation. In this attack,
we focus on the first layer of the convolutional neural network
whose input is the raw image and the computation in this layer is
convolution. Generally speaking, convolution layer uses a 2-D filter
(i.e., kernel) to slide over the 2-D input image (e.g., gray image)
and finally produces another 2-D image (i.e., feature map) using
the convolution operation. Readers can resort to Fig. 9 (a) for an
illustration of the convolution operation.
Neural Accelerator: The computation in the convolution neural
network is usually implemented by neural accelerators on devices
with stringent power budget. They are often based on FPGA or
ASIC, and there are many design available in both academia and
industry [5, 29, 38]. Our target is the convolutional layer, whose
functionality is usually implemented by the line buffer. Line buffer
is composed of buffer lines and a computation unit: buffer lines
are used to cache the pixels in recent lines while the computation
unit calculates the convolution result given the pixels and filter
values. In this paper, we follow the design proposed by Zhao et
al [39]. They implement an accelerator for a compressed version of
CNN [12] on FPGA.
Power characterization of neural accelerator: To accurately
estimate the power constitution of line buffer, we simulated our
designwith Xilinx XPower analyzer and discovered the power in the
convolution unit occupied more than 80% of the total consumption
regardless of the configuration of line buffer. Reader may refer to
the appendix for a complete comparison among different line buffer
configurations. Therefore, we can regard the measured power as a
coarse-grain estimate for the power of convolution unit.
3 THREAT MODEL
Scenario: The primary goal of adversaries is to recover the input
that fed into a convolutional neural accelerator which contains
sensitive private information. Instead of reconstructing the samples
in the training set, the adversaries try to reproduce the online input
when the neural accelerator is actually performing the inference
operation. To facilitate the attack, we consider the adversaries come
from the DNN accelerator design team or they are insiders in the
companies hosting DNN infrastructures so that they are capable to
monitor the power side channel. At inference stage, DNN model
designers usually deploy their trained model on a machine-learning
service operator, such as BigML [13] or Microsoft Azure [14], who
uses dedicated DNN accelerators for the inference operation. They
may also put their models on computing platforms (e.g., Qual-
comm’s Snapdragon 835 [30]) with DNN-accelerating hardware. In
many applications, for privacy concerns, the inputs to the DNN
accelerators are often protected with strict access control policies
or strong encryption schemes. For instance, they may adopt secure
processors, like AEGIS [34], to keep the incoming data confiden-
tial both in memory and on the disk. Thus, for attackers it is very
difficult to obtain the inputs directly. However, the side channels,
especially the power side channel, are exposed unprotected to ma-
licious insiders in the host of machine learning service company
and DNN accelerator design team. They are capable to access to
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Figure 2: Overview of the attack flow.
the power side channel output via malicious implanted Trojans or
measurement circuits when the accelerator is actually running with
real-world users’ inputs.
Capability: Firstly, we assume attackers are knowledgeable about
the structure of the neural network and the input image size, but
not the detailed parameters in the network. To be specific, for the
targeted first convolution layer, the attackers need to know its filter
size, number of input feature maps, and number of output feature
maps. Secondly, adversaries can acquire the power trace of the DNN
accelerator in high resolution either by oscilloscope measurement
or power-monitoring Trojan. We consider these two assumptions
practical because firstly, many image-related tasks adopt existing
neural network architecture (e.g., VGG-16/19 and ResNet) whose
structure (including number of layers and configurations of each
layer) is fixed and public and secondly, from the perspective of insid-
ers, it is easy to implant Trojans or measurement circuits to get the
power traces at runtime. Thirdly, according to the ability of launch-
ing inference operation freely, we further divide the adversaries
into two categories: passive adversary and active adversary. Passive
adversary can only eavesdrop on the power consumption when
an input is processed by the DNN accelerator at inference stage.
Active adversary has an extra capability of profiling the relation-
ship between power and input pixels by freely launching inference
operation with arbitrary inputs on the targeted accelerator. The
profiling phase can only be carried out prior to any actual calcu-
lation of user’s private data. The main difference between passive
and active attackers is the time that they get access to the power
channel of the accelerator. We regard both attackers are realistic as
only if they are physically accessible to the accelerator.
4 OVERVIEW
The primary goal in this paper is to recover the input image from
power traces of the targeted CNN accelerator. The reason we choose
the convolution in the first layer as attack target is as follows:
firstly it directly processes the input image so the power obtained
closely relates to the input. Secondly, the inherent characteristic
of convolution, which performs computation on a small bunch of
pixels, can reduce the effort needed to infer the pixel values.
To evaluate the proposed attack, we implement a CNN accelera-
tor [39] in a Xilinx Spartan-6 LX75 FPGA chip [15] on the SAKURA-
G board [18]. This board is designed for the purpose of evaluating
power side channel attacks. We setup a Tektronix MDO3034 oscil-
loscope [36], with a sampling frequency of 2.5GHz, to acquire the
power trace from the FPGA board.
For passive and active adversaries, we propose attack methods
for them separately. The whole attack flow is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In the first step, we collect the power traces of the FPGA when it
performs the convolution with different kernels. Then we adopt
an extraction algorithm to filter out noise and get the real power
consumption, whose details will be shown in Section 5. After the
power extraction stage, passive adversaries try to locate pixels
belonging to image background from the extracted power. Then the
silhouette of foreground objects is revealed. The details of this attack
are shown in Section 6. For active adversaries, before the actual
attack, they build a “power template” [32] using the powermeasured
with different kernels and the input image. The power template
exploits the relations between power consumption and pixel values
and can generate a set of pixel candidates when queried with power
consumption in actual attacks. The final step for active adversaries
is to recover the image by selecting the best pixel candidate from
the generated set. Section 7 introduces the power template attacks
in detail.
We conducted experimentswith images in theMNIST dataset [21],
a dataset for handwritten digits recognition. We try to recover the
image with both background detection and power template, shown
in Fig. 11 in Section C of the Appendix. For images from background
detection, the general shape of the original image is retained while
the images recovered with power template retain more details and
they are more similar to the original images in visual effect.
5 POWER EXTRACTION
Ideally, the power collected from the oscilloscope is periodic and its
period shall be same with the clock signal, as the internal activity
is triggered by the clock pulse. The power trace in one period
shall reflect the total power consumed in this cycle. However, this
assumption is not valid due to noises and distortions in the power
collecting procedure. Some of the noise sources can be modeled as
a capacitor-based filter system which blends power consumption of
neighboring cycles and thus makes the raw power trace inaccurate
for pixel inference. In this section, we present an efficient method
to extract real power consumption from the noisy and distorted
power traces.
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5.1 Interference Sources
We illustrate three critical components on the power measurement
path in Fig. 3. Driven by clock pulses, CMOS transistors in the FPGA
used for computation become active and draw current from power
supply. The current is delivered through the power distribution
network which leads to a voltage drop in the power measurement
circuit. The voltage drop is then captured by the oscilloscope’s probe
placed on the power supply line and recorded as the power trace.
Real 
Power
FPGA’s Power 
Distribu�on 
Network
Power 
Measurement 
Circuit
Oscilloscope Collected Power Trace
Power alignment 
Curve fi�ng
DC component 
recovery Low-pass filter
Figure 3: Power measurement path in our experiment set-
ting.
All three components incur certain kinds of interference on the
measured power signals. The noise in the measurement of oscil-
loscope is white noise, which mainly comes from environmental
fluctuations.
The adopted FPGA board [19] offers two options for power mea-
surement: we can either directly measure the raw voltage on the
resistor or the amplified signal through an amplifier. It is crucial
for the success of our attack to use the amplified signal as the raw
voltage on the resistor is about several millivolts, which is around
the same level with noise. However, the amplifier circuit is only
able to amplify the AC components of the power traces, which re-
sults in the voltage drop below zero at the end of the power traces,
as illustrated in Fig. 4 (a). The drop not only induces inaccuracies
when we recover the power for each cycle, it also hinders correct
curve-fitting procedure in subsequent procedures. We analyze the
frequency response of the power measurement circuit with a cir-
cuit simulator [16], and find that the whole circuit behaves like a
high-pass filter with the cut-off frequency of around 250Hz.
The exact effect of FPGA’s power distribution network on power
signals is hard to model as we are not knowledgeable about the
design details, but we assume it can be regarded as an RC filter.
This is because power distribution network is often in a tree-like
shape and implemented with metal wires. The distributed wire’s
resistance and the inter-wire capacitance can be regarded as an RC
filter in a lumped model.
5.2 Extraction Methods
For the noise in the oscilloscope measurement procedure, we use
low pass filters to eliminate them. For the distortion from the RC
filters, though techniques directly reversing the distortion effect
exist, they are very sensitive to small deviation [26] in the origi-
nal signal. Thus, they are not applicable to the power traces from
noisy channels. We propose to solve the problem by analyzing the
approximate effect of the RC filters with two dedicated methods:
DC component recovery, power alignment and curve fitting.
Low-Pass Filter: For the noises induced in the oscilloscope mea-
surement, a low-pass filter is enough by filtering out most high-
frequency noises as the low-frequency noises are small compared to
useful signals. We apply a filter whose cut-off frequency is 60MHz
to the acquired power traces and the result is shown in Fig. 4 (b).
DC Component Restoration: For the distortion induced by the
power measurement circuit, we propose to recover the DC compo-
nent. From the simulation result, the cut-off frequency of equivalent
high-pass filter (250Hz) is far lower than the accelerator’s working
spectrum (more than 15kHz, as the total running time is around
70µs). So only the DC component is filtered by the power measure-
ment circuit. To recover it, we obtain the discrete time impulse
response of the power measurement circuit via simulation as fol-
lows:
h(n) =

0 if n < 0
1 if n = 0
−Tτ e−
nT
τ if n > 0
(1)
wherein T stands for the sampling interval and it is 0.4ns in our
case. τ represents the time constant, which is the reciprocal of
the angular cutoff frequency τ = 12π f = 640µs . So we propose to
recover the original power trace by reversing effects of the power
measurement circuit, which can be modelled as x(n) = r (n) ∗ h(n),
using the following formula:
r (n) = x(n) −
n−1∑
i=0
x(i)h(n − i) (2)
wherein the x(n) represents power samples collected while the r (n)
stands for sample points in the recovered trace.
PowerAlignment andCurve Fitting: Though the FPGA’s power
distribution network is also RC-filter-like, it is hard to approximate
it to simple low-pass or high-pass filters as its frequency response
overlaps the spectrum of power traces. Alternatively, based on this
RC filter assumption, we further assume the power trace acquired
per cycle is similar to the capacitor’s charging and discharging
curve. Then we use curve fitting tools to obtain the exact power
consumption in one cycle. In the first step, we need to align the
power trace with the clock signal. A template signal, representing
a typical power trace in one clock cycle as shown in Fig. 4 (c), is
carefully chosen from the filtered power trace manually and we
calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient of the template signal
with each sample point on the original power trace. We choose the
points with maximum coefficients to be the alignment points. The
aligned power trace is shown in Fig. 4 (d).
For power signals in each cycle, they all rise sharply at first and
then gradually descend, which comes from the charging and dis-
charging of the equivalent capacitor in power distribution network.
Thus, we fit the power curve with capacitor’s charging formula
Vc (t) and discharging formula Vd (t) as follows:
Vc (t) = Vp (1 − e−
t
RC ),Vd (t) = Vpe−
t
RC (3)
in which the Vp represents the final voltage at the charging stage
and the initial voltage in the discharging phase. RC is the product
of equivalent resistance and capacitance of the power distribution
network, also known as RC time constant, represented by τ . The
whole power extraction algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. Also we
illustrate this procedure in Fig. 4 (e). The algorithm is run cycle-
wise: for each cycle, we estimate optimal Vp and τ from the power
trace using curve fitting function and calculate the trailing power in
subsequent cycles. The final power for current cycle is accumulated
by the power in this cycle and the trailing power. The trailing power
is then subtracted from following power traces. The computation
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Figure 4: Power extraction on traces collected.
continues until all aligned cycles are processed. The solid red line
in Fig. 4 (e) shows the optimal curve we find while the dash red
line shows the trailing power for each cycle.
Algorithm 1: Cycle Power Extraction
Input: A vector p containing all sample points in collected
power trace; A set of tuples indicating start and end
indexes for each cycle in the power trace
S = {(ist , ied )j |for j in all cycles}
Output: A vector P containing the real power consumption
for each cycle
1 for j in all aligned cycles do
2 ist , ied ← S[j];
3 ptrace ← p[ist : ied ];
4 param ← CurveFitting(ptrace );
5 ptrail ← GenerateTrailingTrace(ptrace ,param);
6 P[j] ← sum(ptrace ) + sum(ptrail );
7 p[ied : ied + len(trailinд)]− = ptail inд ;
8 end for
6 BACKGROUND DETECTION
In this section, we first discuss the intuition of our background
detection attack. Then we introduce the threshold-based attack
method and at last we evaluate it with MNIST datasets [21].
6.1 Intuition
For passive adversaries, the intuition to attack the DNN accelerator
comes from the powermodel: the power consumption is determined
by the internal activities, especially by those in the convolution
unit which takes the largest portion of power consumption. If the
data inside the convolution unit remain unchanged between cy-
cles, the internal transitions induced are limited. Thus, the power
consumption shall be small. Based on this insight, by observing
the magnitude of power consumption in each cycle, passive adver-
saries can determine whether the related pixels share similar values.
These similar pixels most probably belong to the pure background
of the image. As a result, the silhouette of the foreground object nat-
urally revealed by locating all pixels belonging to background and
the privacy of user’s information may be infringed via adversaries’
visual inspection.
Thoughmany real-world images have amessy background, some
types of privacy-sensitive images happen to contain pure back-
ground, such as medical images from ultrasonography or radiogra-
phy. If the adversaries are able to recover the shape of foreground
object, they may be able to identify the organ being scanned and
thus infer the health condition of a particular patient.
6.2 Attack Method
The basic idea of the attack is to find a threshold to distinguish
cycles processing background pixels based on the magnitude of
power consumption. However, deciding the exact threshold is not
a trivial task as we cannot observe a clear gap in the distribution of
power consumed in each cycle, as shown in histogram in Fig. 5 (a).
We assume the power consumed in cycles processing foreground
pixels are evenly distributed across a large range while the power
consumption of rest cycles aggregates at the bins of smaller values.
So we are expected to observe a peak in cycle counts for smaller
cycle power consumption. In this case, we decide the threshold by
finding the maximal decrease in cycle count:
PT = argmax
P
C(P − B) −C(P) (4)
wherein the C(·) is the function returning the cycle count for a
particular power consumption, B is the bin size.
After the threshold is determined, we filter out all cycles whose
power consumption is above the threshold. Then we locate all
corresponding pixels for the left cycles. These pixels are regarded
as background pixels and then we can get a black-and-white image
for further examination and analysis.
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6.3 Evaluation
Experiment Setup: We performed our attack on the CNN accel-
erator used to classify the digits in MNIST datasets. The size of the
images in MNIST datasets is 28×28. The images have a clear black
background which satisfies the pre-requisite of our background
detection method. For the CNN accelerator [39], we set the line size
of the line buffer to 28, input channel to 1 and the kernel size to 3×3
and 5×5. We adopted two models for experiment with their details
shown in Table 1. The only difference between the twomodels is the
kernel size as it directly determines the number of pixels involved
in the convolution unit and affects the granularity of recovered
images.
Table 1: Binarized CNN Model Details on MNIST datasets
Model 1 Model 2
No. of layers 4
Accuracy on testing sets 99.42% 99.27%
Type of 1st layer Convolution
Kernel size in 1st layer 3 × 3 5 × 5
No. of kernels in 1st layer 64
We synthesized the CNN accelerator design to FPGA and loaded
the model parameters into the accelerator before the inference
stage. We randomly chose 500 images from the MNIST testing set
to evaluate our attack method. Both models contain 64 different
kernels in the first layer and for each kernel, we recorded the power
trace when the accelerator performed the convolution in the first
layer. As our algorithm recovers the pixel values on a cycle base,
we need to precisely identify the power trace fragment for the
convolution in the first layer. It is trivial to locate the start point on
the power trace and the length of fragment can be determined from
the total clock cycles needed to finish the convolution computation.
Evaluation Metric: We evaluate the quality of recovered images
with two metrics: pixel-level accuracy and recognition accuracy.
Pixel-level accuracy is to evaluate the precision of our attack algo-
rithm and it is defined as follows:
αpixel =
∑
x∈I
Jf (x) =marker (x)K/|I|. (5)
in which x represents a pixel in the targeted image I. f (x)means the
background marker (whether it belongs to background) predicted
by our algorithm whilemarker (x) represents the correct marker.
For MNIST images, we regard all pixels with value 0 (i.e., pure black
pixel) as the background pixels. We also evaluate the cognitive
quality of the recovered image with recognition accuracy. We feed
every recovered image to a high-accuracy MNIST classification
model and compare the prediction result with its correct label. In the
following experiment, we use amulti-layer perceptron network [12]
with an accuracy of 99.2% as a golden reference to evaluate the
cognitive quality.
Choices of Threshold and Kernel: We show a histogram of
power consumed in each cycle in Fig. 5 (a). In the figure, we draw
the histograms for the power computed with two different kernels
from model 1 and they manifest similar trends: with the increase of
power consumed per cycle, the cycle count rises at first and then
descends sharply at the value of 0.5. After that, the cycle count
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Figure 5: (a) Histogram of power consumed per cycle with
two kernels. (b) Accuracy with two kernels on model 1.
gradually decreases and finally reaches 0. Based on the threshold
selection criteria, we choose the threshold at 0.5 for this image.
To demonstrate the importance of threshold choice in the attack,
we recover the silhouette images using various threshold values
from 0.1 to 3.0 with a step size of 0.1 and illustrate the two metrics
in Fig. 5 (b). The pixel-level accuracy is drawn with solid lines while
the recognition accuracy is drawn using the dot-dash lines. We
observe that as the threshold increases, the pixel-level accuracy
increases to its peak value around 85.6% for both kernels at first
and then it gradually decreases to 83.3%. The recognition accuracy
for these two kernels also follows similar trends: they first rise
to its peak accuracy, but they drop significantly as the threshold
increases. For kernel 1, it reaches its peak value 81.6% at threshold
0.5 while for kernel 2, it reaches peak of 81.8% at threshold 0.3.
When the threshold approaches its optimal value, more andmore
background pixels are correctly identified, sowe observe an increase
in both pixel-level accuracy and recognition accuracy. After the
threshold exceeds the optimal value, the pixel-level accuracy only
drops a little, while the recognition accuracy falls remarkably. This
is because the actual number of foreground pixels is smaller than
the background pixels. When threshold increases, the number of
misclassified pixels is limited thus it does not affect the pixel-level
accuracy much. However, as foreground pixels are key components
to construct digit strokes, their misclassification leads to significant
loss in recognition accuracy. According to these two curves, the
optimal range of threshold lies between [0.3, 0.5], which is the
region in two green dashed lines in Fig. 5 (b). It is consistent with
the threshold selection criteria we raised in last subsection. Another
conclusion from the experiment is that both accuracy metrics are
seldom affected by the choices of kernel. Therefore, adversaries can
acquire acceptable images by only attacking on the power trace for
one kernel.
Kernel Size: Kernel size can be a significant factor affecting both
the pixel-level and recognition accuracy. The average pixel-level
accuracy for model 1 (3×3 kernel size) is 86.2% while the accuracy
for model 2 (5×5 kernel size) is around 74.6%. The recognition accu-
racy is shown in Fig. 6: on average case, 81.6% for images recovered
from power acquired with model 1 and 64.6% with model 2. The
accuracy degradation comes from the information loss when kernel
size increases. It is because our algorithm is only able to find cycles
that deal with background pixels via thresholding, which requires
all the pixels inside the convolutions units to be identical. In other
words, if the convolution unit contains a non-background pixel,
all other background pixels may be mis-identified as foreground
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Figure 6: Recognition accuracy for model 1 and model 2.
pixels by our proposed algorithm. This effect is similar to the mor-
phological dilation operation [31] in the digital image processing
which widens the shape of foreground objects. The recovered image
looks “fatter” than the original image in visual effect. Key struc-
tures smaller than the kernel size are more probable to disappear,
resulting in the degradation of recognition accuracy.
Another discovery is that the recognition accuracy is various for
different digits, especially for model 2. Fig. 6 shows the recognition
accuracy categorized by the class of digits. The accuracy of classi-
fying original image is almost the same and nearly perfect for all
classes. The recognition rates of digits 3, 7 and 9 are below average
for images recovered with model 1. Meanwhile, the accuracy of
digits 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9 drop significantly for model 2. We consider the
discrepancy among different digits comes from inherent structure
of digits and equivalent dilation effect of recovered image. For ex-
ample, the image of digits 1 recovered from model 2 is much “fatter”
than that from model 1 due to dilation effect, so it is more probable
for the classification network to misclassify it as digits 8, causing a
low recognition rate.
We also investigate the classification result of recovered images
for each digit with both models. The results are drawn in the classi-
fication map shown in Fig.7. Each cell (i, j) in the map represents
the portion of images with correct class j which are predicted as
class i , wherein the portion is illustrated with the darkness. For both
models, the darkest color all lies on the diagonal of the map, which
means the classification network is able to correctly predict in most
cases. We observe the recognition accuracy of digits 8 is quite high
(around 90%) for model 2 in Fig. 6. However, the precision is not.
From Fig. 7 (b), the cells in the column of inferred digits 8 are darker
than other cells in the same row except for genuine class 8. Thus,
for an image inferred as digit 8 may have larger probability to be
other digits actually because of its low precision. This is because
the inherent shape of 8 is large than other digits and the classifica-
tion network is more inclined to classify a “fatter” image, which is
caused by dilation effect, to digits 8.
To conclude, the kernel size affects both the pixel-level accuracy
and recognition accuracy due to their equivalent dilation effect
induced by kernels. The recognition accuracy of different digits
also varies because of their inherent structure.
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Figure 7: Classification map for model 1 and model 2.
Complexity: The attack method only attacks one power trace.
As the power extraction and background detection procedure are
cycle-based, the time complexity is proportional to the total number
of cycles to compute the convolution which is determined by the
image size O(Sx × Sy ), where the Sx and Sy is the length of the
image in two dimensions. The total time used is short in practice.
It takes around 6s to obtain one power trace and 5.7s for power
extraction. For actual image reconstruction it only takes 0.01s.
7 IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION VIA POWER
TEMPLATE
In this section, we propose an attack method, for active adversaries,
to recover the details of images used in the inference process. In-
stead of predicting background marker, we try to obtain values for
each pixel. The section is organized similarly with Section 6 with
three subsections: intuition, attack method and evaluation.
7.1 Intuition
The search space to recover pixel values is prohibitively large even
if only considering the pixels in a small local region. Suppose the
targeted model uses a 3×3 kernel size for the first convolution layer,
the number of pixels involved in the convolution in one cycle is
12 (see the analysis in Section 7.2). Typically a pixel can have a
value ranging from 0 to 255, so the total combinations for the pixels
involved is around 25612 ≈ 7.9 × 1029. Iterating all combinations
of pixel values in brute force is inefficient to perform the attack.
Thus, for active adversaries, we propose to reduce the search space
significantly by building a “power template”. As active adversaries
are able to profile the relationship between power consumption
with arbitrary input images, the pre-built “power template” is able
to efficiently predict the pixel value at actual attack with knowledge
acquired at profiling stage.
As illustrated in the third part of Section 2, the power consumed
in each cycle is determined by the data inside convolution unit,
which comprise pixel values and kernel parameters. Typically, the
same inputs are convolved with different kernels in the convolu-
tional layer. For a specific region of pixels processed by convolution
unit, we can regard the power consumption acquired from different
kernels as a unique feature to infer the value of the pixels. Based on
this intuition, we build a “power template” storing the mapping of
power consumption to pixel values so that adversaries can produce
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a set of possible pixel values from a vector of power consumption
retrieved at attack time. Finally, after we acquired many candidate
values for each pixel from multiple power vectors, an image recon-
struction algorithm is adopted to select the best candidate. As one
pixel is processed in multiple cycles, the target of the selection is
to find candidates in these cycles predicting similar values at this
pixel.
7.2 Attack Method
In this subsection, we introduce the detailed steps to recover pixel
values of the input image. First we discuss how to build the power
template at the profiling stage. Then, with the extracted power
from different kernels acquired at attack time, we demonstrate
the method to get candidate pixel values from power template.
Finally we present an algorithm to reconstruct the image from
these candidates.
Power Template Building: Power template stores the mapping
between pixel values and its corresponding power consumption
when convolved with different kernels. In the profiling phase, for
each input image, we collect multiple power traces from the FPGA
loaded with different kernels and obtain power consumption at
each cycle using power extraction in Section 5.
The power consumed in each cycle is determined by the state
transitions of the convolution unit. The kernel remains constant
between cycles, while the pixels are shifted within a row. So the
number of related pixels in one cycle is K ×(K + 1) when the kernel
size of is K × K . For example, suppose at cycle j − 1, pixels from
position (x ,y) to (x + K ,y + K) are inside the convolution unit,
while at cycle j , pixels from position (x ,y + 1) to (x +K ,y +K + 1)
are processed. The power consumed in cycle j is induced by change
in the convolution unit, so all pixels from (x ,y) to (x +K ,y +K + 1)
determine the power consumption. We represent the this region as
Ωj and the pixel values in this region as Pxj = {pv(x) | for x ∈ Ωj }.
These pixel values are named related pixels for j-th cycle. Further,
we represent the power consumption in j-th cycle when the image
is computed with i-th kernel as ρi, j .
So for each cycle, we obtain the related pixels Pxj and the power
collected with different kernels, namely power feature vector, repre-
sented as ρ j = (ρ0, j , ..., ρ |K |, j ). |K | is the number of kernels used.
For one input image at profiling stage, the power template is con-
structed by adding all pairs of related pixels and corresponding
power feature vector for all cycles. We define the power template
formally as follows:
PT = {(Pxj : ρ j )|for j in all cycles}.
The final power template is the union set of power templates con-
structed by every input image.
Candidates Generation: Based on the assumption that similar
pixels processed in the convolution unit generate similar power
feature vector, the straight-forward way to get pixel candidates is
to find pixel values in the power template whose corresponding
power feature vector is closest from that extracted during attack.
However, this method easily fails due to limited samples enrolled in
the power template. Hence, we propose to divide the power feature
vector into several groups and search them in the power template
respectively. After we get the pixel candidates for each group, we
take the intersection of them to generate the final candidate set for
image reconstruction.
To be specific, for a specific cycle j, we acquire a power feature
vector ρ ′j from measured power traces and separate them into sev-
eral groups of same size ρ ′j = {ρ1j
′
, ..., ρmj
′}. For each entry in the
power template, we do the same separation, i.e., ρ = {ρ1, ..., ρm }.
For each group of vectors ρmj
′, we search the same group of power
feature vectors in the power template ρm and return the related
pixels if the distance between two groups is within a threshold δ .
The candidate set, consisting of all returned related pixels, is given
by
S
j
m = {Px |
for all (Px : ρ) in PT and dist(ρm , ρmj ′) < δ }
where the distance metric is defined by
dist(ρm , ρmj ′) =
∑
i ∈Km
| |ρi − ρ ′i, j | |2,
The Km represents the kernel indexes of power features grouped
to them-th group. The final candidate set for the specific cycle j
is given by the intersection of the candidate sets from all different
groups, i.e., S j = ∩mS jm .
Image Reconstruction Algorithm: After obtaining the candi-
date sets for all cycles, we have many possible values for each pixel
and the target is to find the closest one to the actual value.
As we have noted that the same pixel is processed in different
cycles, so the candidates selected among these cycles shall be consis-
tent on the value of the same pixel. We use this as a criterion to find
the optimal selection. Suppose for a pixel at position x = (i, j), there
are t cycles processing this pixel: Cx = {c1, ..., ct }. The candidate
sets for these cycles are Sc1 , ..., Sct . From each candidate set, we
choose a candidate with a selector Selct as Pxct = Sct [Selct ], and
we find the pixel value pv(x) at position x in Pxct . The variance of
pixel values at position x selected from different candidate set shall
be small. The objective of our image reconstruction algorithm is to
find a selector vector so that the selected candidates minimize the
sum of the variance of all pixels in the image. It can be represented
as follows:
min
Sel
∑
x∈I
var ({pv(x) | pv(x) ∈ Pxct for ct ∈ Cx}) (6)
After the selector vector is determined, for each cycle, we get only
one candidate. But for each pixel, we get multiple candidates from
cycles processing it. To get the final value of the pixel, we take the
average of these candidates.
This optimization problem is not easy to solve, here we present
a greedy heuristic method shown in Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, we start with a random candidate set and for
each candidate in the set, we initialize an empty image with the
pixels in the candidate (Line 6–8), other pixels are left undecided.
Then we greedily search the unprocessed candidate set and find the
candidate whose Ωt overlaps current image to the largest extent
(Line 10) and who has the smallest distance with the overlapped
pixels in the current image (Line 11). The image is then updated
accordingly with the candidate and its index is recorded (Line 12–
13) . This process is repeated until all candidate set is processed,
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Algorithm 2: Image Reconstruction Algorithm
Input: Sets of candidates for related pixels {S1, ..., ST } for all
T cycles extracted
Output: A selector Sel of size T that minimizes the sum of
variance defined in Eq. 6
1 TempStore = [];
2 Sr ← Random({S1, ..., ST });
3 foreach related pixels Px in Sr do
4 I← EmptyImage();
5 Sel ← EmptyVector();
6 foreach pixel pv(x) in Px do
7 I[x] ← pv(x);
8 end foreach
9 while there exists candidate set unprocessed do
10 t ← SelectCycle(I);
11 Px′ ← MinimalDiscrepancy(St , I);
12 I← Update(I, Px′);
13 Sel[t] ← Idx(P′x);
14 end while
15 σ ← CalculateVariance(Sel , {S1, ..., ST });
16 TempStore.add((σ , Sel ));
17 end foreach
18 Sel ← FindMinimal(σ ,TempStore);
19 return Sel
and then a selector of sizeT is generated. We calculate the variance
defined in Eq. 6 for the selector (Line 15–16). After all candidate in
the original set Sr is processed, we find the selector with minimal
variance and return it as the final result (Line 18–19).
7.3 Evaluation
Experiment Setup: We followed the same experiment setup in
Section 6.3 except that we used 300 images to build the power
template and the left 200 images to evaluate attack method. The
pixel value in the MNIST digits is in the range of [0, 255]. We
chose to build the power template with power traces collected
with 9 different kernels instead of all 64 kernels, because it already
provides enough precision to recover the input image.
Evaluation Metric: We use the same evaluation metrics with
those in the background detection except the pixel-level accuracy
is re-defined with pixel values instead of background markers as
follows:
αpixel =
∑
x∈I
| |pv(x) − pvд(x)| |2/|I| (7)
in which pv represents the pixel value in the recovered image while
pvд means the pixel value in the original image.
Candidates Generated: To evaluate the effectiveness of grouping
power vectors in the power template, we list the statistics of candi-
dates returned by the power template in Table 2. As we collected
power traces from 9 different kernels, so the length of power feature
vector for each cycle is 9. In the experiment, we divided the power
features into 4 groups of size 2 (using first 8 features) and 3 groups
of size 3 respectively. The number of candidates returned by the
power template for one group is denoted as |S | and the distance
Table 2: Candidates Statistics for Model 1 (3 x 3 Kernel Size)
δ
GroupSize = 2 GroupSize = 3
|S | Dmin |S∩ | D∩min |S | Dmin |S∩ | D∩min
0.1 767 57 107 190 325 153 48 155
0.2 1448 45 351 116 787 90 170 102
0.5 3847 33 1086 90 2447 48 715 68
1.0 9457 26 2223 67 5890 34 1571 56
threshold is δ . We also calculate the distance between each can-
didate and the genuine related pixels and represent the minimal
distance as Dmin , which serves as the quality metric of returned
candidate set: the smaller, the better. For the final candidate set, i.e.
the intersection of all candidate set from different groups, we also
report the number of candidates in the set |S∩ | and the minimal
distance D∩min . Table 2 shows the average of these numbers among
all cycles.
From the table, the number of candidates increases with the
increase of threshold δ as larger search space is included. Also the
average of minimal distance decreases when more candidates are
included. For smaller δ , such as 0.1 and 0.2, the number of candidates
returned are small, and for many cycles, we are not able to find
a match inside the template. Thus, smaller δ may lead to lower
precision in finding the related pixels. For two experiments with
different group size investigated, both of them achieves significant
reduction in the size of final candidate set, while maintaining similar
capability to recover more precise pixels (reflected by small changes
of Dmin ) at medium or large δs.
In all, the grouping of power feature vectors and intersection of
candidate sets from power template is effective in reducing the size
of pixel candidates for each cycle while maintaining the accuracy
at the same time.
Image Quality: Based on the experimental result in Table 2, we
proceed the image reconstruction with group size 3 as the final
candidate size is relatively small to group size 2. We also determine
the δ to be 1.0 to maintain a high accuracy candidate set for further
reconstruction. For the left 200 images used for evaluation, using
Algorithm 2, we recover them from the candidate sets from the
power template. We also generate images without using this algo-
rithm for comparison. Without Algorithm 2, for a particular pixel in
image, its value is given by the average of all possible values for this
pixel in the returned candidates. The average pixel-level distance,
defined in Eq. 7, is 1.65 for image generated with Algorithm 2 and
2.98 for images without it. On an average case, both of them are
quite close to the genuine image considering the pixel value range
is 0 to 255. This is because the candidates generated from power
template are already close to the genuine pixels.
However, as illustrated in Fig. 8, the recognition accuracy is
much higher with Algorithm 2. The recognition accuracy of images
recovered for model 1 (3×3 kernel size) with the algorithm is 89.8%
while the accuracy drops down to 15% if we take the average of all
the pixel candidates. The same accuracy drop also happens on the
images recovered from power trace collected with model 2 (5×5
kernel size), from 79% to 10%. Though the images recovered without
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Figure 8: Recognition accuracy formodel 1 andmodel 2with
and w/o. reconstruction algorithm.
the proposed algorithm achieve relatively good pixel-level accu-
racy, the low recognition accuracy results from its incapability to
reconstruct the structure of digits at some critical points, especially
at the edge of digits. On the contrary, Algorithm 2 considers the
consistence of related pixels recovered among cycles, thus it is able
to filter out most unrelated pixels.
Finally, enlarging kernel size incurs a little degradation in the
recognition accuracy, from 89.8% to 79% as more pixels are involved
in one cycle so that it is relatively harder to distinguish the genuine
pixels.
Complexity: We analyze the complexity in three phases: The time
complexity to build power template isO(N ×C×K)where N stands
for total number of images enrolled, C means the cycles needed to
generate one feature map andK is the number of kernels. The mem-
ory complexity in power template building is O(N ×C × (K + S)),
where N ×C represents the total amount of entries in power tem-
plate and K + S is the entry size. S stands for the size of related
pixels. In the candidate generation, the time complexity of propor-
tional to the size of the power template and the size of returned
candidate sets. Finally, for the image reconstruction algorithm, the
most time-consuming part comes from the loop in it (Line 3 – 17),
so its complexity isO(C ×A2), whereC is total number of candidate
sets (equal to the cycles needed to generate a output feature map)
and A stands for the average size of the candidate set. All methods
in three phases can be implemented efficiently and we report their
running time as follows: it takes 215.6s to build the power template
from 300 images and 157.2s to generate candidates for all cycles in
recovering one image. The image reconstruction algorithm costs
around 43.2s to finish. The size of the power template built with
300 images enrolled is around 44MB.
8 RELATEDWORK
Neural Network Privacy: In [8], authors made a successful at-
tempt to correlate the dosage of certain medicine with a specific
patient’s genotype from a model used in pharmacogenetics. Also,
on a face recognition system, they managed to reconstruct users’
face images enrolled in the training stage from the neural network
models [7]. Shokri et al [33] presented a membership inference
attack to decide whether a particular data record belongs to the
model the training set with a black-box access to the model. Tramer
et al [37] demonstrated a model inversion attack by exploiting the
relationship of queries and confidence values on different machine
learning models, such as DNN, logistic regressions, etc. Despite the
attacks exploiting the privacy leakage in the training sets, Hua et
al [11] presented a novel attack to reverse engineer the underlying
network information. They utilize the memory accessing patterns
to infer the network structures, such as number of layers, the feature
map sizes of each layer. They also showed the values of weights
can be recovered if the memory access can be observed during
a “zero pruning” stage. The main difference of our attack from
above-mentioned ones is the attack target. Our proposed attack try
to explore the leakage at inference stage. Instead of training set
samples or network models, we can recover an image for runtime
inputs using the power side channel.
Power Side-channel Attack: The power side-channel leakage
can be exploited to recover the secret keys in cryptographic devices.
By analyzing the difference of multiple power traces with diverse
inputs, attackers are able to uncover the secret key in widely used
symmetric encryption standards, such as DES [17] and AES [3, 9,
23]. Eisenbarth [6] and Msgna [25] showed they can recover the
instruction type executed by processor via power side channel
using hidden Markov model. Liu et al [22] managed to accurately
locate each instruction instance during execution with a modified
Viterbi algorithm. Building a “power template” is a common way
used to break secret keys in cryptographic systems [4, 32]. Similar
to our proposed attack, they firstly estimate a leakage model from
the collected power traces and the secret keys and then at runtime,
using the leakagemodel they predict the keys from the online traces.
Though the general procedure is similar, the difficulty in building
“power traces” is to find a proper attacking surface. In template
attacks, they need to identify power traces which only correlate
with a limited number of the key bits. In our attack, we found the
convolutional unit as the appropriate attack target and raised the
attacking method accordingly.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate the first power side channel attack
on an FPGA-based convolutional neural network accelerator. Its
input image is successfully recovered using the power traces mea-
sured for inferencing operation. In the attack, we firstly filter out
the noises and distortions in power measurement process. Then
we consider two attacking scenarios for adversaries of different
abilities. They can either passively eavasdrop the power side chan-
nel or additionally profiling the correlation between power signals
and image pixels. For the two adversaries, we propose two meth-
ods respectively: background detection and power template, to
recover the input image in different granularity. We demonstrate
the practicality of our proposed attack on an accelerator executing
classification task for hand-written digits in MNIST datasets and the
experimental results show we achieve high recognition accuracy.
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A PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first review the concept of convolutional neural
network (CNN), and then introduce the architecture of typical CNN
accelerators and finally discuss the basics on power side-channel
leakage.
A.1 Convolutional Neural Network
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [20] is a neural network
architecture used for image applications. It is constructed by a
pipeline of sequentially connected layers and may consist of four
types of computation: convolution, pooling, normalization and full-
connected. The structure of the network, such as total number of
layers and the type of computation in each layer, is determined
by designers prior to the training stage. Then the parameters in
each layer, namely weights, are acquired through dedicated train-
ing algorithms. In the inference stage with structure and weights
ascertained, CNN can make predictions with the input images. In
particular, the input of first layer of CNN is image itself and the
computation in the first layer is usually convolution.
As our focus is on the convolution layer of CNN, here we briefly
introduce its details and illustrate the calculation in Fig. 9 (a). The
input to the convolution layer is an image of size X ×Y ×M and we
call the X × Y 2D pixel array feature map. For each input feature
map, to calculate the pixel value of the output feature map, a kernel
(or filter) of size Kx × Ky is applied to construct a convolutional
window for each input pixel capturing its neighbors. We then get
an output feature map with the convolutional window sliding by
steps of Sx and Sy in two directions of the input feature map. We
can represent the convolution operation formally with following
formula:
O
j
x,y = f (
M∑
i=1
(βi, j +
Kx−1∑
a=0
Ky−1∑
b=0
ω
i, j
a,b × I ixSx+a,ySy+b )), (8)
where the O jx,y is the pixel value of position (x ,y) in j-th output
feature map,ωi, j and βi, j are the kernel and bias value between the
i-th input feature map and the j-th output feature map respectively,
and f (·) is a non-linear activation function such as tanh or siдmoid .
A.2 CNN Accelerator Design
An accelerator is usually used in the inference stage to boost the
computational efficiency in a number of low-power platforms. The
accelerators are usually implemented by dedicated hardware, such
as FPGA andASIC and there are a number of designs available [5, 29,
38] in both academia and industry. The general architecture of these
accelerators is similar, as shown in Fig. 9 (b) wherein typically five
components are involved: Direct Memory Access (DMA), controller,
data buffers, parameter buffers and compute units. DMA is used
for the data transmission with main processors while controller is
responsible for coordinating computation tasks among components.
The parameter buffers store the weights used in the CNN model
and shall be ready prior to any inference operation. The data buffer
stores the input feature maps for every layer and caches the output
feature map from computing units to be used in the next layer.
Compute units contain dedicated hardware to accelerate different
operations in the neural network, e.g., convolution, pooling, etc.
Specifically, as the target of our attack is the convolutional layer
in the CNN, we present the detailed design for the convolution
operation in the compute unit. Line buffer [2] is an efficient hard-
ware structure to implement convolution and it has been adopted
by a number of CNN accelerators [5, 29, 38]. Fig. 9 (c) shows the
structure of line buffer to execute 2D convolution with a 3×3 kernel.
There are three line registers to compute the convolution with a
kernel of size 3 × 3 as we need to cache the pixel values in recent
three rows of the image. The length of each line is equivalent to
the row size of input image. The convolution is achieved by a set
of dedicated hardware multiplier and adders. At each cycle, one
pixel is put into the line buffer, and a 3× 3 convolution is computed.
The intermediate result is passed through a non-linear function to
generate one output value per cycle. If the input image contains
several channels (e.g., three channels for an RGB image), multi-
ple instances of line buffer are synthesized for parallel procession.
When all input pixels are processed by the line buffer, one output
feature map is finished and stored on the data buffer for process-
ing in the next round. The above-mentioned procedure is repeated
until we generate all output feature maps with different kernels.
As we can see from the operation of line buffer, at each cycle, the
output only depends on a limited number of input pixels (inside the
convolution window), which serves as the foundation to efficiently
launch our proposed attack.
In this paper, we follow the implementation proposed by Zhao
et al [39] who implement accelerator for a compressed version
of CNN [12] on FPGA. The convolution unit in their proposed
architecture is based on the line buffer. In their neural accelerator,
the parameters and activations inside the network model is limited
to either 1 or -1 so that the weights of compressed network can be
completely stored inside the RAM of FPGA.
A.3 Basics on Power Side Channel
Power Constitution and Measurement: The power consump-
tion of circuits can be divided into two categories: static and dy-
namic. Static power consumption arises from the leakage current of
transistors and is typically very low. Dynamic power consumption
comes from internal transitions of transistors which closely relate
to its input data and it usually dominates the total power consump-
tion in its magnitude. To measure the power consumption, a 1Ω
resistor is placed on the power supply line and the voltage drop on
it is measured using a high-resolution oscilloscope.
Table 3: Estimated power consumption for line buffer
Line Buffer
Configuration
Convolution Unit
Power Estimation
Total Power
Estimation
IC: 1, LS: 28, KS: 3 x 3 0.57mW 0.67mW
IC: 1, LS: 32, KS: 3 x 3 0.64mW 0.79mW
IC: 1, LS: 28, KS: 5 x 5 1.25mW 1.51mW
IC: 3, LS: 28, KS: 3 x 3 1.78mW 2.07mW
* IC – Image Channel, LS – Line Size, KS – Kernel Size
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Figure 9: (a) 2D Convolution operation in CNN. (b) Architecture of CNN implementation in [39]. (c) Structure of line buffer
Power Consumption of Line Buffer: As the line buffer is the
main attack target, we estimated the power consumption of the
convolution unit and total power consumption with Xilinx XPower
Analyzer, a software power emulator for FPGA. We implemented
the line buffer in RTL with various configurations and the result is
shown in Table 3, wherein the convolution unit dominates the total
power consumption. To be specific, we implemented four common
configurations of line buffer: three of them have only one input
channel, but the line size is 28 and 32 respectively and kernel size
can be either 3x3 or 5x5. The last configuration is of three input
channels, its line size and filter size are identical to that in the first
row. From the statistics of Table 3, the power consumption of the
convolutional unit increases significantly due to the increase of
kernel size and input channel. It is because in these two cases, the
pixels involved in the convolution unit increases. The change of line
size does not affect much of the power consumed by convolution
units. Whatever the configuration, the power in the convolution
unit occupies more than 80% of the total consumption. Therefore,
we can regard the measured power as a coarse-grain estimate for
the power of convolution unit.
B DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this section, we first discuss the applicability of our proposed
attack and the attack target of background detection method. We
also discuss the countermeasures, limitations and future work.
Applicability: Though we evaluate our power side-channel attack
on the accelerator implemented on FPGA, the actual attack target
is the structure of line buffer where we exploit the power consump-
tion with the sliding convolutional window over the input image.
Thus our attack is applicable for whatever designs adopting the line
buffer to execute the convolutional operation. Though line buffer is
not suitable for DNN system on CPU or GPU, it enjoys popularity
among a variety of FPGA- or ASIC-based neural network acceler-
ators [5, 29, 38]. Considering the promising future application of
neural accelerators, the proposed attack is a severe threat for the
security of them.
AttackTarget of BackgroundDetection: Firstly, the background
detection method proposed in Section 6 is not guaranteed to find all
pixels in pure background because its recovery granularity is lim-
ited by the kernel size. Thus, the background detection method can
fail to recover the images with a messy background. Secondly, the
threshold used in background detection is determined by the sharp
descend of cycle counts of power consumed per cycle. We may not
be able to observe the decline if the number of background pixels is
far less than the foreground pixels. To summarize, the background
detection method can recover the images which contains a pure
and relatively large background region.
Extension to other datasets: In our proposed attack, we built our
template with MNIST dataset and verify the runtime results with
it. It is essential to discuss whether our attack method is still appli-
cable to other datasets. Ideally, the recovery template is built from
data inside the convolutional window and the corresponding power
consumption, which is independent from the chosen dataset if the
template is built in a way avoids overfitting. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed attack, we launch both background
detection and power template attacks on an image extracted from
the Digital Database for Screening Mammography (DDSM) [10],
a medical image dataset for mammography research. Fig. 10 (a)
shows the original image (resized to 168 × 84) from the dataset. It is
a side-view radiology image of human breast. Fig. 10 (b) and Fig. 10
(c) illustrate the recovered image using background detection and
power template respectively. The template used for this demonstra-
tion is the same with that we used to recover the MNIST images
in Section 7.2. From the recovered image, we can see the shape of
breast is pretty much preserved in Fig. 10 (b), thus for adversary
the shape can be used to infer the potential scanned organ of the
patient. This leakage somehow reveals the privacy of the patient.
We can also get more details in the image recovered from power
template. The pixels gradually get lighter from the border part of
the breast to the center part, which is consistent with the original
image. Though the quality of recovered image cannot reflect every
detail of the original image, it still can be used to deduce private
information by adversaries.
Countermeasures: The most straight forward way to prevent
the side channel attacker is to add noises on power side channel,
but it does not grant strong guarantees on the privacy protection
as noises can still be somehow cancelled with its distribution. For
performance and security reason, countermeasures against power
side channel attack can be implemented by mainly two ways: ran-
dom masking and random scheduling. Random masking breaks the
correlation between the power consumption and the sensitive data
by masking the intermediate result with a random number. For
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Figure 10: Results on a Mammographic image
instance, before the convolution, each pixel value used for computa-
tion is added with a random number. Then after the convolution re-
sult is obtained, the result is subtracted by the sum of these random
numbers weighted by the convolution kernel. Random scheduling
is effective against active attackers who utilize power from multiple
kernels. If the convolution computation for each kernel is executed
in a random order rather than sequentially, active adversaries will
not be able to build an accurate power feature vector and they can
fail in producing a recognizable image.
Limitations and Future Work: As mentioned in above subsec-
tions, the current proposed attacking algorithm only works for
designs based on the line buffer (e.g., on FPGA or ASIC) and it
cannot be directly applicable for GPU or TPUs. The attacks can
also be defended by simple randomization techniques as discussed
in the previous subsection. Thirdly, our proposed attack algorithm
is currently profiling the power consumption with images coming
from the same sampling set. They inherently resemble each other
so that we can achieve high recognition accuracy with relatively
low overhead. On the other hand, the images adopted in the exper-
iment are either quasi-binary (MNIST) or simple gray-scale images
(mammographic pictures). If the attackers target at images with
multiple input channel (e.g., color images) or they are not able to
get the input images with same distribution of attack target in the
profiling phase, more data need to be enrolled to achieve acceptable
results. Thus, it is essential to handle the performance problem
incurred by complex image recovery task and limited capability of
obtaining data from similar distribution. We may resort to follow-
ing techniques to tackle the problem: we can use PCA to compress
the power feature vector and related pixel values to reduce the size
of the pre-built power template and use SVM or random forest to
choose candidates in actual attacks. We plan to incorporate them
in our future work and validate our method on more complicated
datasets, such as CIFAR-10 or even ImageNet.
C ATTACK RESULTS ON THE MNIST
DATASET
The recovered image of from power side channel is illustrated in
Fig. 11. For two recovery methods, we select the correctly classified
images with the same input image so that we can compare the
quality of recovered images directly.
REFERENCES
[1] Martín Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian J. Goodfellow, H. Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov,
Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. 2016. Deep Learning with Differential Privacy. In
Proc. of ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
308–318.
[2] B. Bosi, Guy Bois, and Yvon Savaria. 1999. Reconfigurable pipelined 2-D con-
volvers for fast digital signal processing. IEEE Transactions on VLSI Systems 7, 3
(1999), 299–308.
[3] Eric Brier, Christophe Clavier, and Francis Olivier. 2004. Correlation Power
Analysis with a Leakage Model. In Proc. of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems - CHES. 16–29.
[4] Omar Choudary and Markus G Kuhn. 2013. Efficient template attacks. In Inter-
national Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. Springer,
253–270.
[5] Francesco Conti and Luca Benini. 2015. A ultra-low-energy convolution engine
for fast brain-inspired vision in multicore clusters. In Design, Automation & Test
in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2015. IEEE, 683–688.
[6] Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar, and Björn Weghenkel. 2010. Building a Side
Channel Based Disassembler. Trans. Computational Science 10 (2010), 78–99.
[7] Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. 2015. Model Inversion
Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures. In Proc.
of ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
1322–1333.
[8] Matthew Fredrikson, Eric Lantz, Somesh Jha, Simon Lin, David Page, and Thomas
Ristenpart. 2014. Privacy in Pharmacogenetics: An End-to-End Case Study
of Personalized Warfarin Dosing. In Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security
Symposium, San Diego, CA, USA, August 20-22, 2014. 17–32.
[9] Benedikt Gierlichs, Lejla Batina, Pim Tuyls, and Bart Preneel. 2008. Mutual
information analysis. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems–CHES
2008 (2008), 426–442.
[10] M. Heath, K. Bowyer, Daniel B. Kopans, P. Kegelmeyer Jr., Richard H. Moore,
K. Chang, and S. Munishkumaran. 1998. Current Status of the Digital Database
for Screening Mammography. In Digital Mammography, Fourth International
Workshop on Digital Mammograph, IWDM 1998, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, June
1998. 457–460. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5318-8_75
[11] Weizhe Hua, Zhiru Zhang, and G. Edward Suh. 2018. Reverse engineering convo-
lutional neural networks through side-channel information leaks. In Proceedings
of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC 2018, San Francisco, CA,
USA, June 24-29, 2018. 4:1–4:6.
[12] Itay Hubara, Matthieu Courbariaux, Daniel Soudry, Ran El-Yaniv, and Yoshua
Bengio. 2016. Binarized Neural Networks. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 29: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems
2016, December 5-10, 2016, Barcelona, Spain. 4107–4115.
[13] BigML Inc. 2017. BigML. https://www.bigml.com/
[14] Microsoft Inc. 2017. Microsoft Azure Machine Learning. https://azure.microsoft.
com/en-us/services/machine-learning/
[15] Xilinx Inc. 2017. Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA family. https://www.xilinx.com/
products/silicon-devices/fpga/spartan-6.html
[16] National Instruments. 2017. NI Multisim. www.ni.com/multisim/
[17] Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. 1999. Differential Power Analysis.
In Proc. of Annual International Cryptology Conference - CRYPTO ’99. 388–397.
[18] Satoh Lab./UEC. 2017. SAKURA-G. http://satoh.cs.uec.ac.jp/SAKURA/hardware/
SAKURA-G.html
[19] Satoh Lab./UEC. 2017. SAKURA: Side-channel AttacK User Reference Architec-
ture – Specification. http://satoh.cs.uec.ac.jp/SAKURA/hardware/SAKURA-G_
Spec_Ver1.0_English.pdf
[20] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, et al. 1995. Convolutional networks for images,
speech, and time series. The handbook of brain theory and neural networks 3361,
10 (1995), 1995.
[21] Yann LeCun, Corinna Cortes, and Christopher J.C. Burges. 2001–. THE MNIST
DATABASE of handwritten digits. http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
[22] Yannan Liu, Lingxiao Wei, Zhe Zhou, Kehuan Zhang, Wenyuan Xu, and Qiang
Xu. 2016. On Code Execution Tracking via Power Side-Channel. In Proc. of ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 1019–1031.
[23] Thomas S. Messerges. 2000. Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA
Resistant Software. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES
2000, Second International Workshop, Worcester, MA, USA, August 17-18, 2000,
Proceedings. 238–251.
[24] Payman Mohassel and Yupeng Zhang. 2017. SecureML: A System for Scalable
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy SP. 19–38.
[25] Mehari Msgna, Konstantinos Markantonakis, and Keith Mayes. 2013. The B-
Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems.
In Security and Privacy in Communication Networks - 9th International ICST
Conference, SecureComm 2013, Sydney, NSW, Australia, September 25-28, 2013,
Revised Selected Papers. 288–304.
[26] Tom O’Haver. 1997. A Pragmatic introduction to signal processing.
[27] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z. Berkay
Celik, and Ananthram Swami. 2016. The Limitations of Deep Learning in Ad-
versarial Settings. In Proc. of IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy,
EuroS&P. 372–387.
[28] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram
Swami. 2016. Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations Against
ACSAC ’18, December 3–7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA L. Wei et al.
Original
Image
Background
Detection
(3 x 3 Kern Size)
Pixel Recovery
via Power Template
(3 x 3 Kern Size)
Figure 11: Recovered image of correctly classified digits.
Deep Neural Networks. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy SP.
582–597.
[29] Jiantao Qiu, Jie Wang, Song Yao, Kaiyuan Guo, Boxun Li, Erjin Zhou, Jincheng Yu,
Tianqi Tang, Ningyi Xu, Sen Song, et al. 2016. Going deeper with embedded fpga
platform for convolutional neural network. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM/SIGDA
International Symposium on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays. ACM, 26–35.
[30] Qualcomm. 2017. Artificial intelligence tech in Snapdragon 835. https://www.
qualcomm.com/snapdragon/artificial-intelligence
[31] C Rafael Gonzalez and Richard Woods. 2002. Digital image processing. Pearson
Education (2002).
[32] Christian Rechberger and Elisabeth Oswald. 2004. Practical Template Attacks. In
Information Security Applications, 5th International Workshop, WISA 2004, Jeju
Island, Korea, August 23-25, 2004, Revised Selected Papers. 440–456.
[33] Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2017. Mem-
bership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models. In Proc. of IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP. 3–18.
[34] G. Edward Suh, Dwaine E. Clarke, Blaise Gassend, Marten van Dijk, and Srinivas
Devadas. 2003. AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant
processing. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Conference on Super-
computing, ICS 2003, San Francisco, CA, USA, June 23-26, 2003. 160–171.
[35] Vivienne Sze, Yu-Hsin Chen, Tien-Ju Yang, and Joel Emer. 2017. Efficient process-
ing of deep neural networks: A tutorial and survey. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.09039
(2017).
[36] Tektronics. 2017. MDO3000 Mixed Domain Oscilloscope. http://www.tek.com/
oscilloscope/mdo3000-mixed-domain-oscilloscope
[37] Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart.
2016. Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium, USENIX Security 16, Austin, TX, USA, August 10-12, 2016.
601–618.
[38] Chi Zhang and Viktor Prasanna. 2017. Frequency domain acceleration of convo-
lutional neural networks on CPU-FPGA shared memory system. In Proceedings
of the 2017 ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field-Programmable Gate
Arrays. ACM, 35–44.
[39] Ritchie Zhao, Weinan Song, Wentao Zhang, Tianwei Xing, Jeng-Hau Lin, Mani B.
Srivastava, Rajesh Gupta, and Zhiru Zhang. 2017. Accelerating Binarized Convo-
lutional Neural Networks with Software-Programmable FPGAs. In Proc. of the
ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays FPGA.
15–24.
